Modern datacenter (DC) 
Introduction
The shift toward DC, e.g., warehouse-scale computing [12, 11] and cloud computing [87, 85, 5, 71, 59, 67] calls for the new OS architecture. On one hand, modern DC workloads have differentiated QoS requirements in terms of the average or worst-case performance. As a notable emerging class of workloads, user-facing services require very low tail latency 1 -the worst-case performance-in stead of the average performance on each node. Traditional OS abstractions and structures are proposed for the average performance [82, 40, 22, 46, 7, 10] . The widely used Linux, Linux container (LXC) [7] , or Xen [10] , adopt monolithic 1 Tail latency [26, 56, 50] is the latency of all requests at a certain percentile, e.g., 99th percentile latency. kernels or virtual machine monitor (VMM) that share numerous data structures protected by locks (share first), and then a process or virtual machine (VM) is proposed to guarantee performance isolation (then isolate). In the rest of this paper, we call this kind of OS architectures "share first, then isolate" (in short, SFTI). The SFTI OS architecture has its inherent structure obstacle in achieving the worst-case performance, because contending shared structures not only hurt performance, but also deteriorate performance interferences. We need to change the OS structure in this case.
On the other hand, previous joint work between academia and industry [55] shows modern DC workloads are with significant diversity in workload behavior with no single silverbullet application to optimize for and with no major intraapplication hotspots. This observation has two implications for the OS research efforts. First, it is no longer possible to tackle this challenge in an ad-hoc manner by repeatedly identifying and removing the bottlenecks [94, 38, 43, 68, 81] . Even we can optimize the OS for the main classes of workloads, if they require different kernel changes, there is no guarantee that the changes will compose [16] . Second, while previous work done on exokernels [79, 14, 17, 16, 19] offers interesting alternative approaches to this problem, monolithic kernels are commercially significant [7] , especially for DC workloads.
This paper presents an "isolate first, then share" (in short, IFTS) OS model, as shown in Figure 1 . We decompose the OS into the supervisor and several subOSes running side by side. A subOS isolates resources first through directly man-aging physical resources without invention from the supervisor, and the supervisor enables resource sharing through creating, destroying, resizing a subOS on-the-fly; SubOSes and the supervisor have confined state sharing, but fast intersubOS communication mechanisms based on shared memory and IPIs are provided on demand. We propose utilizing the mutual protection of Instrumentation-based Privilege Restriction (IPR) and Address Space Randomization (ASR) [27] to enforce security isolation.
On several Intel Xeon platforms, we applied the IFTS OS model to build the first working prototype-RainForest on the basis of Linux 2.6.32. Our current implementation does not include safety isolation. We performed comprehensive evaluation of RainForest against three Linux kernels: 1) 2.6.32; 2) 3.17.4; 3) 2.6.35M, a modified version of 2.6.35 integrated with sloppy counters [20] ; LXC (version 0.7.5 ); XEN (version 4.0.0). Our comprehensive evaluations show RainForest outperforms Linux with three different kernels, LXC, and Xen in terms of improving resource utilization, throughput, scalability and reducing tail latency.
Related Work
The closest system to RainForest is Solaris/Sparc [3] , which runs multiple OS instances in several ways. First, the firmware hypervisor beneath logical domains runs in an additional hyper-privileged mode, and it handles all hyperprivileged requests from logical domains via hypervisor APIs. Second, a root domain presumes a special architecture-a multi-PCIe-root-complex SPARC machine connected by PCI-E switches. Each root domain runs on a root complex. Changing any I/O allocation of a root domain requires an electrical restart. Third, dynamic domains support cross-node resource sharing in different system boards/blades whose system buses are connected. RainForest has two distinguished characteristics: (1)a subOS directly manages resources without the intervention from the supervisor, which itself is software; (2) RainForest presumes a one-root-complex machine, and a subOS can be created, destroyed and resized within a one-rootcomplex machine.
We compare the IFTS architecture with the others as follows. First, a monolithic OS integrates all management facilities into the kernel space and provides high-level abstractions and interfaces for user applications. Much previous work scales the existing multiprocessor OSes to accommodate many processors in an ad-hoc manner, by repeatedly identifying and removing the most contended bottlenecks [94, 38, 43, 68, 81] . Focusing on how to reduce sharing for shared-memory systems, Tornado [33] and K42 [61] introduce clustered objects to optimize data sharing in terms of concurrency and locality through the balance of partitioning and replication. Resource containers/LXC [7] separates a protection domain from a resource principal but shares the same structure of a monolithic kernel.
Second, microkernels [31, 13, 37, 30, 28] move most kernel management into user space services to reduce user space context switches. But globally-shared data structures exist in kernel components. SawMill [34] , Mach-US [53] , Pebble [32] , MINIX [45] decompose the OS into a set of user-level servers executing on the globally-shared microkernel and a set of services that enable these servers to obtain and manage resources locally. A recent systemTessellation [25] factors OS services and implements them in user space (similar to fos [99] ). For the multi-server OSes [34, 53, 32, 45] , the OS is decomposed into several servers or services with complex dependencies, which amplifies the performance outliers in serving a user-facing request.
In addition, multi-server OSes have a globally-shared microkernel, while each subOS in RainForest runs independently. Third, OS functionalities of an exokernel [29] are pushed to library OSes linked with individual user-level processes. The globally-shared kernel still controls the access of lowlevel resources, handle scheduling, interrupts, and exceptions, and delivers network packets. Corey [19] resembles an exokernel which defines a shared abstraction that allows applications to dynamically create lookup tables of kernel objects and determine how these tables are shared. The recent two systems, Arrakis [79, 14] , and IX [17, 16] make applications directly access virtualized and physical, respectively, I/O devices through libos so as to speed up network-intensive workloads.
Fourth, there are a number of other ways to build virtualization systems, which range from the hardware (e.g., IBM LPARs [51] ) up to the full software, including hardware abstraction layer VMs (e.g., Xen [10] ), operating system layer VMs (e.g., LXC/Docker [7, 69] , VServer [88] ), and hosted VMs (e.g., KVM) [58] . Xen resembles an exokernel, with low-level multiplexing of resources among relatively independent domains. Running beneath all VMs, VMM creates and manages virtual resources. Even physical resources are directly allocated to, a VM still needs VMM intervention, e.g., interrupting VMs' execution because of various exceptions. Recursive virtual machines [31, 36] [102] allow OSes to be decomposed vertically by implementing OS functionalities in stackable VMMs. Disco and Cellular Disco [39, 21] use virtual machines to scale commodity multi-processor OSes. VirtuOS [75] exploits virtualization to isolate and protect vertical slices of existing OS kernels. Unikernels [67] are single-purpose appliances that are compile-time specialized into standalone kernels and sealed against modification when deployed to a cloud platform.
Finally, a number of systems reconstruct the traditional OS as a distributed system: either base on hardware partitioning [3] , or view the OS states as replicated [14, 84, 15, 8, 86, 54, 77] , or span an OS across multiple cache-coherence domains [65] or hardware accelerators [74] , or restrict the management functions of the hypervisor [57, 90] . BarrelFish reconstructs the OS as a peer-to-peer distributed system built on exokernels, whose states are strictly synchronized via mes-sage passing among all CPU drivers on each core. Popcorn [9] constructs a single system image on top of multiple Linux kernels (each runs on a different ISA) through a compiler framework, making applications run transparently amongst different ISA processors.
Previous performance isolation solutions [95, 87, 42, 35] , focus on queuing policies or resource allocation algorithms. Other related work includes tail-latency tolerant systems [56, 63, 64, 49, 97, 80, 103] , and resource accountability [23, 85, 5] .
Motivation
In this section, the hardware and software configurations are consistent with that in Section 7 accordingly. Figure 2a shows on a recent Linux kernel (3.17.4) the cumulative distribution of latencies of a simple micro-benchmarkmmap (the average is about few microseconds) from the Willit-scale benchmark suite [4] on a 12-core server. This benchmark creates multiple processes, each creating a 128M file and then repeatedly mapping and unmapping it into and from the memory. On the same number of cores, we have the following observation: as the process number increases, tail latency significantly deteriorates. It is mainly because of frequent accesses on a global variable vm_commited_as protected by a spinlock. vm_commited_as is a percpu_counter and should streamline concurrent updates by using the local counter in vm_commited_as. But once the update is beyond the percpu_counter_batch limit, it will overflow into the global count, causing false sharing and high synchronization overhead. Our experiments show similar trends in other WillIt-Scale benchmarks (e.g., pagefault, malloc).
Tail latency reduction challenge
3.1.1. Meet with increasing many-core We repeat the memcached experiment (its average latency is about tens or hundreds of microseconds) presented in [20] on a 40-core servera near future main-stream server. This time we profile the response time and focus on the tail latencies. We run multiple memcached servers simultaneously, each on its own port and bound to a dedicated core. Enough clients are deployed to saturate the servers to get highest throughput as in [20] .
In Figure 2b , we observe three Linux systems-2.6.32, 2.6.35M [20] , and 3.17.4 exhibit poor tail latency as the core number increases, while we also note that on the three Linux systems, the average latency does not increase much as the core number increases. Though many bottlenecks were fixed through modifying the NUMA memory allocation policy as local allocate, rearranging falsely shared structures, and replacing the dst_entry structure's reference counter with a sloppy counter [20] , synchronization operations over a large scope of sharing are more unpredictable and result in poor worst-case performance. Figure 2c measures the deterioration of 99th percentile latency of Search-a search engine workload from the BigDataBench benchmark suite [98] (its average latency is about tens or hundreds of milliseconds) co-located with each PAR-SEC workload [2] on a 12-core server running three different kernels. Although consolidation increases the resource utilization, the tail latency degrades by tens of times, which is unacceptable for large-scale services. Even we fix CPU affinities for Search and PARSEC processes and specify the local allocate memory allocation policy, the maximum degradations are still above forty. The interference can be attributed to the resource contention inside the monolithic kernel and inevitable disturbance from the synchronization operations.
Performance interferences of co-located workloads

Discussion
The literature [64, 20, 38] conclude the microscopic reasons for the performance interference and scalability issues residing on both software and hardware levels: (1) contention for shared locks, i.e., locks for virtual memory operations, process creation and etc.; (2) competing for software resources, such as caches, lists, and etc.; (3) other in-kernel mechanisms like scheduling and timers; (4) micro-architecture events for consistency, such as TLB shootdown, cache snooping, etc.; and (5) competing limited hardware capacities, such as bandwidth.
We can contribute most of the microscopic reasons (1,2,4) to the SFTI architectures that share resources and states from bottom to up. Since the computers have been embracing extraordinary densities of hardware and the DC applications are with increasing diversity, large-scales and being more sensitive to interferences, we believe that it is the right time to reconstruct the OS. So we take a new approach to build the OS: isolate resources and states first, and then share them through restructuring the OS.
The IFTS OS Model
In this section, we present the IFTS OS model, which is guided by three design principles: (1) Elastic physical partition; (3) Confined state sharing; (3) subOS as an OS abstraction. We also propose the security solution.
Elastic physical partition
We divide the OS into the supervisor and several subOSes: the supervisor discovers, monitors, and provisions resources, while each subOS independently manages resources and runs applications. We physically partition the node resources into several physical resource zones on each of which runs the supervisor or a subOS. The supervisor runs on the first physical resource zone. Subject to the hardware architecture, each zone may include at least a CPU core or SMT (Simultaneous Multi-Treading) thread (if supported), a memory region at a fine or coarse granularity, and optionally several peripherals. This approach enables the OS to strengthen isolation among mixed workloads. On one hand, applications on two subOSes do not intend to share software-level resources. Note that it does not preclude subOSes sharing memory between cores (see Section 4.2). Instead, in a system with global sharing of kernel structures, processes contend with each other for limited resources, such as dentry cache, inode cache, page cache, and even routing table. On the other hand, hardware units like TLB entries are no longer necessarily shared by subOSes, and TLB shootdown is unnecessary to broadcast to all cores.
Physically partitioning node resources makes resource sharing much difficult. To overcome this limitation, we allow creating, destroying and resizing a physical resource zone and its subOS accordingly on the fly, which we call elastic physical partition. This is an important extension to reflect the requirements of DC computing. Their workloads often change significantly in terms of both load levels and resource demands, so an IFTS OS needs to adjust the subOS number or resize each subOS's resources. This property not only facilitates flexible resource sharing, but also supports shrinking durations of rental periods and increasingly fine grained resources offered for sale [5] .
Most of server workloads are fast changing, e.g., their ratios of peak loads to normal loads are high. So resizing a subOS must be fast or else it will result in significant QoS violation or throughput loss. Experiences show the feasibility of hot-adding or hot-plugging a physical device in Linux [73, 83, 62] or decoupling cores from the kernel in Barrelfish/DC [101] . We can further shorten the long path of initializing or defunctioning a physical resource from the ground up in existing approaches as discussed in Section 5.
Resource overcommitment increases hardware utilization in VMM as most VMs use only a small portion of the physical memory that is allocated to them. Similarly, an IFTS OS allows resource preemption among subOSes. For example, a subOS preempts cores of others if its load is much heavier. Latency critical workloads may benefit from resources provisioning with a higher priority when mixed with offline batches.
Confined state sharing
An IFTS OS reduces the overhead through confined state sharing as follows:
First, physically partitioning node resources inherently reduces the sharing scope inside a subOS. As a subOS runs within a resource zone, the execution will not cross over the zone boundary. Software operations like lock/unlock and micro-architectural operations like TLB shootdown and cache synchronization will thus happen within a smaller scope. Meanwhile, the traffic through system interconnects will also decline. However, extremely restricting a subOS onto a single core is probably not the best option. Applications may expect for a different number of cores and threadto-core mappings [92] .
Second, inter-subOS state sharing is kept on a very low level. It is ideal that no state is shared among subOSes. But the hardware trend towards high density and fast interconnection accelerates intra-node data exchange. And the supervisor has to communicate with subOSes for coordination. On one hand, we demand the data structures shared by the supervisor and all subOSes are quite limited. As resource management is locally conducted by subOS kernels, global coordination and monitoring enforced by the supervisor are much reduced. On the other hand, we facilitate two subOSes to construct mutual communication channels on demand. In this context, the negative effects of frequent updates in the communication are neutralized by a small sharing degree. It also makes sense in the scenario that the supervisor transfers messages to a subOS for dynamic resource reconfiguration. An IFTS OS makes it possible to make a tradeoff of resource sharing within a subOS and among subOSes, which gains the best performance for typical server workloads, e.g., the Spark workload as shown in Section 7.4.2. Table 1 summarizes RainForest's state sharing reduced against other systems, including Linux, XEN, LXC, Bar-relFish, and IX. We investigated the shared states among execution environments inside an OS from three aspects: contention for shared locks, competing software resources, and micro-architecture events for consistency. We can see that only RainForest has the least shared states and that the microarchitecture events are limited in the scope where a subOS resides. As for the communication channels between two subOSes, they are established on demand and the shared structures do not influence on other subOSes.
subOS as an OS abstraction
In our IFTS model, subOS is a new OS abstraction.
First, the subOS abstraction is proposed as an OS management facility. Through creating, destroying, or resizing a subOS, the resource provider can flexibly provision physical resources for each resource user. From this perspective, the subOS abstraction is orthogonal to the existing OS abstractions proposed for resource management, i.e. the resource container [7] , and DUNE process [16, 17] .
Second, the subOS abstraction makes resource accounting much easier and more accurate. A subOS owns exclusive resources, independently runs applications, and shares few states with others, which clears up the confusion of attributing resource consumptions to applications because of scheduling, interrupt serving, peripheral drivers and etc.
Third, two subOSes can establish internal communication channels, which resembles inter-process communication (IPC) in a monolithic OS. A subOS can map a memory zone of another subOS to enable shared memory like mmap in Linux.
Fourth, a subOS can spawn another subOS like forking a child process in Linux, which makes it possible the existence of a variety of relationships between subOSes. Management of a child subOS can be transferred to its parent.
Security
Physical attacks are not considered. We assume that the CPU, memory controller, I/O peripheral devices and firmware operate exactly following their specifications and do not perform malicious operations. Besides, we assume a trusted booting mechanism (e.g., Intel TXT [48] ) exists and the booting of the supervisor or any subOS kernel is trusted.
In our threat model, threats come from the bugs and vulnerabilities within the kernel of the supervisor or subOSes. Since the kernel has the highest privilege, attackers who compromise the kernel could manipulate the underlying hardware state (e.g., MMU configuration, interrupt handling, system registers) by executing any privileged operations. On a oneroot-complex server, they can access the data in memory or on disk belonged to other subOSes or even make others crash.
To defend such attacks, we have two options: hardware support and software approaches. An alternative hardware for our model is a multi-core processor with efficient customization on the isolation of the whole memory space tagged by the logical processor identifications. Such architectual support are still unavailable and far from application. Thus, we take a software approach, which is inspired from a novel framework that achieves the same-privilege isolation [27] . We can utilize the mutual protection of Instrumentation-based Privilege Restriction (IPR) and Address Space Randomization (ASR), presented in [27] , to enforce security isolation among the supervisor and subOS kernels. ASR is a lightweight approach to randomize the code and data locations of a few newly-added module in the supervisor and subOS kernel, which we consider TCB, to ensure their locations are unpredictable in virtual address space, thus preventing the adversary who has knowledge of the memory locations from subverting them. Through IPR, we can intercept the specified privileged operations in the kernel and transfer these operations to Security guard-a newly added module-in the same privilege. ASR prevents IPR from being evaded, and in turn IPR protects ASR from being disabled. The approach has been demonstrated to be secure (the probability of the first guessing of the location of TCB is 1/16384 on a 64-bit platform) and introduce trivial overhead. More details could be found in Section 5.6.
Implementation
We explore the implications of these principles by describing the implementation of RainForest, which is not the only way to apply the IFTS OS model.
Test platforms
RainForest currently runs well on x86-64 platforms. We tested it on five platforms: Intel Xeon E5620, E5645, E5-2620, E5-2640, and E7-8870 for more than three years. In the rest of this paper, the performance numbers are reported on two servers with typical configurations: a mainstream 12-core server (S-A) and a mainstream server with 40 cores and 1 TB memory in near future (S-B). Table 2 shows the configuration details. Figure 3 depicts the RainForest structure. Ideally, the supervisor can be constructed as a specialized firmware to avoid occupying resources that can be allocated to subOSes. In our current implementation, the supervisor is the firstly booted OS instance on each machine, and occupies at least one core or SMT thread and several MB of memory. Being initialized in booting up subOSes (including the supervisor), FICM (Fast Inter-subOS Communication Meachnism) provides the basic interfaces for inter-subOS communication. FICM forks low-level message channels among subOSes based on inter-processor interrupt (IPI) and shared memory. A core is selected as the communication core in a subOS. On each subOS, we fork two FICM kernel threads (read/write) with real time priority to transfer tiny immediate messages in units of cache lines (typically 64 Bytes) using NAPI interfaces (New API, which combines interrupts and polling). It supports unicast, multicast, and broadcast operations. Upon FICM, supcon in the supervisor and subOScon in a subOS implement the primitives of subOS management, respectively. Primitive commands issued from one end will be conducted and handled by the other. Resource provisioner provides interfaces for a full-fledged user space management tool-rfm. Currently, the functions of Resource provisioner and supcon are implemented into a kernel module named RFcontroller.
System structure
SubOS management
Memory organization: Figure 4 summarizes the organizations of physical and virtual memory spaces of a subOS. Conventionally, Linux directly maps all physical memory from zero to PAGE_OFFSET so that the conversion between virtual and physical addresses can be easily carried out by macros __pa and __va. In a subOS, we map the start address of its physical memory to PAGE_OFFSET and rephrase the __pa and __va macros. Other fix-mapped structures, which are mostly architecture-specific, are revised to create a safe booting environment. To support logical hot-add and hotplug of memory regions whose physical addresses are ahead of the ones that are initially allocated to a subOS, we map them into a hole after __START_KERNEL_map in the address space instead of the direct-mapping address space starting from PAGE_OFFSET.
Creating a subOS: Before starting a subOS, RFcontroller prepares the least descriptions of hardware, upon which a subOS can successfully start up. In the normal Linux booting, it is actually conducted by BIOS. The information that RFcontroller fills for a subOS includes the description of SMP (MP Configuration Table) , memory regions (E820 Table) , and boot parameters. A new bootparam parameter is added to instruct the kernel with a white list of passthrough PCIe endpoints. For the X86-64 architecture, we employ a two-phase jump after RFcontroller issues a restart command to the designated BSP (Bootstrap Processor) of a subOS. Once finishing the mode switch in the common trampoline in low memory, the execution will jump to the customized trampoline residing in its exclusive physical memory.
Though in RainForest each subOS independently manages its own physical resources, it still needs help from the supervisor. It is because a few hardware resources must be accessed via atomic operations or strictly protected from simultaneous updates. A typical example is the low memory (< 1M) where resides a small slice of trampoline code that is needed for any X86 processor to finish mode switches. Similar situations exist in the management of I/O APIC pins and PCI configuration registers. RainForest adopts global spinlocks stored in a globally shared page that is mapped into the address spaces of both the supervisor and subOSes. Please note that this pro-tection is specific to the x86-64 architecture.
Resizing a subOS: Linux supports device hot-plug to allow failing hardware to be removed from a live system. However, the shortest path of functioning or defunctioning a device for elastic resource adjustment in a subOS is different from failing over hardware failures. We made great effort to shorten the path of logical hot-add and hot-plug by removing several unnecessary phases. For example, we reduce the overhead of a CPU hot-add operation from 150 ms to 70 ms by removing the delay calibration of each CPU. For a memory hot-add operation, we reduce the scope of scanning removable page blocks through a short list recording the page blocks reserved by the kernel.
In RainForest, every resource adjustment operation is recorded by the supervisor, which can be further configured to collect the running information through subOScon from the proc subsystem. In particular, hardware performance counters can be accurately employed using the perf tools in a subOS to monitor architectural events of its CPUs. Besides, resource borrowing is allowed among subOSes but needs to be registered on the supervisor via a specified command.
Destroying a subOS: A subOS releases all shared resources before sending a shutdown request to the supervisor. The supervisor then prepares a designated trampoline program, forces it to transfer the CPUs to the supervisor via the trampoline, and finally reclaims other resources.
Communication subsystems
FICM is preferably used for light-weight messages. To meet with different requirements of continuous and bulk communication, we introduce diverse communicating facilities including RFcom, RFloop, and other virtualization infrastructures.
RFcom exports high-level interfaces to kernel routines and user-space programs to facilitate inter-subOS communication. They are rf_open, rf_close, rf_write, and rf_read, rf_map, and rf_unmap. The former four interfaces operate on a socketlike channel, upon which subOSes easily communicate with packet-type messages. The other two interfaces help map and unmap shared memory to individual address spaces, but without explicit synchronization mechanisms.
RFloop creates a fully-transparent inter-subOS network loop channel on the basis of Linux netfilter. Network packets going to subOSes in the same machine will be intercepted on the network layer and transferred to the destination subOS. We achieve high bandwidth by adopting a lockless buffer ring and decreasing notification overhead using NAPI interfaces.
When the number of PCI-passthrough devices is insufficient for all subOSes, such as RAID controllers, RainForest adopts the splitting driver model applied in paravirtualization technologies. We base the network virtualization on the universal TUN/TAP device driver [60] (RFtun), and the filesystem virtualization on FUSE [91] (RFfuse). To gain better performance isolation and access control, we attach all back-end threads into a control group created specifically for each subOS. Under the control group, resource consumptions of the back-end drivers can be accounted.
Shared states
Except for the mutually shared states in the private communication channels between two subOSes, the supervisor shares few states with all subOSes.
First, the supervisor manages a few globally-shared states that are publicly available to all subOSes. These states include the communication-core list, which is used for IPIs in FICM, and the MAC list, which is used to sniffer packets in RFLoop. The communication-core list is modified if the CPUs of a subOS change or a different load balancing algorithm is adopted for FICM. The MAC list is modified when a subOS is created or destroyed. As these updates are usually infrequent, state sharing can be implemented via either shared memory or messages.
Second, the supervisor reserves privileged operations on the protected resources that can not be modified by a subOS. Typical examples include the low memory, the I/O APIC, and the PCIe configuration registers, as discussed in Section 5.3.
Security issue
Our current implementation does not provide security isolation among the supervisor and subOSes. However, we provide a reference design. As shown in Figure 5 , we apply the IPR and ASR approaches to protect the key modules of RainForest through a kernel module named Security guard. Security guard instruments a small number of privilege operations in the kernel subsystems: Resource provisioner, supcon, and FICM.
On every subOS we run Security guard, which maps the descriptions of elastic partitions into its own address space as read only pages. The supervisor has the only right to modify it, while Security guard only needs to read the descriptions to check the legality of privileged operations in the kernel. According to the threat model, we only need to prevent the malicious code from interrupting the execution of other subOSes or accessing their data, which indicates that the instrumentation efforts can be limited. Security guard should intercept the execution like mov − to − cr3 and page table update to bound the supervisor and subOSes' physical address space according to the descriptions of elastic physical partitions. Besides, we do not necessarily intercept all privilege instructions but HALT and INIT. Intercepting the IOMMU configuration is necessary if we need to guarantee the DMA isolation and interrupt safety.
As the code size of Security guard and the other newly built-in modules is small, we consider them as TCB while the other kernel code and user space applications are untrusted. The integrity of TCB can be ensured using the authenticated boot provided by the platform module (TPM) [41] . Same as [27] , we map the TCB to a random location in the virtual address space during the initialization phase at kernel startup. Since a subOS kernel will never access the region where Security guard is randomized, any incorrect guess in this region are considered to be malicious. In a nutshell, we do not interfere with the kernel and user application except for intercepting a few configuration operations to guarantee resource boundaries. In fact, complex access control can also be applied in the coordination of Security guards, such as protection from IPI flooding which affects the normal running of other subOSes.
Refactoring Efforts
Most of the Linux software stack is unmodified to support the existing Linux ABI. Table 3 summarizes the new and modified lines of code in RainForest, most of which are performed in the portable functions and independent modules. Out of the key effort in the kernel change, the largest portions are FICM and the functionalities of the supervisor, which can be dynamically activated or deactivated. This ensures the full utilization of the node resources. For LXC and Xen, we bind each OS instance's CPUs or virtual CPUs to physical CPUs, which helps decrease the influence of process scheduling. The NUMA memory allocation policy is local allocation, which preferably allocates local memory in the same node to their CPUs accordingly. For Linux kernels, we do not pin the benchmarks on specific CPUs or specify the memory allocation policies, making them compete for system resources without restriction. Since there are abundant ethernet adapters in a single node, we make each OS instance directly access one to get near-native performance. For the storage, we attach each OS instance a directly accessed disk when deploying two OS instances in a 12-core server, one under an LSI SAS1068E SAS controller and the other under an Intel ICH10 AHCI controller. When running four OS instances on a S-B-type server, we adopt the tmpfs in-memory file systems to reduce the contention for a single disk.
Understanding the root causes
We ran the Will-It-Scale benchmark suite to inspect the advantage of the IFTS architecture. We deploy six OS instances on an S-A type server. Each OS instance runs a process and the number of threads increases with the cores. We record the average latencies, tail latencies, and standard deviations.
To explain three specific root causes mentioned in Section 3.3, we deliberately only present the performance numbers of three benchmarks: malloc, munmap, and open. Among them, the malloc operations contend for the free list locks [70] ; the munmap operations cause TLB shootdown to other CPUs [96] ; the open operations competes for both locks and dentry cache [93] . Note that RainForest does not intend to eliminate the causes (3) and (5) in Section 3.3, as well as other systems. Figure 6 shows the performance curves of the standard deviations of each benchmark. According to our observation, the performance curves of the average latency and tail latency are positively correlated with the standard deviation. We only present their standard deviations in Figure 6 . We note that many of the bottleneck or contention points have been optimized with the evolving Linux kernel, For example Linux kernel 3.17.4 has better open performance. However, on the basis of Linux kernel 2.6.32 with the only structure change, the latencies on RainForest exhibit better performance in the other two cases. Meanwhile, the optimization measures in Linux kernel 3.17.4 can also be applied to the subOS in RainForest.
Performance isolation
In this section, we use both micro benchmarks and application benchmarks to measure performance isolation of different systems on an S-A type server with two OS instances.
Mixed microbenchmarks
The micro benchmarks we used include SPEC CPU 2006 [44] (CPU intensive), cachebench [72] (memory intensive), netperf [52] (network intensive), IOzone [1] (filesystem I/O intensive). 11 benchmarks from four benchmark suites are selected to exert heavy pressures to different subsystems. We investigate the mutual interference of any two benchmarks which are deployed in two OS instances in a single server. The two OS instances, each with 3 cores and 8 GB memory, run in the same NUMA node rather in two NUMA nodes, producing more performance interference. As the processes contend heavily on accessing (especially writing) files on a disk in the IOzone case, we make them read/write files in the tmpfs file system to stress the filesystem caches and memory instead of physical disks. For cachebench, we set the footprint to be 32 MB, which is greater than the LLC and makes more pressure on the memory system. When running two netperf benchmarks on Linux, each of them uses a NIC with an IP in different networks. Figure 7 reports the performance degradation of each foreground benchmark affected by the background one with respect to solo running the foreground one. RainForest exhibits good performance isolation except for running cachebench.write and cachebench.modify benchmarks as backgrounds. LXC and Xen have heavier performance interference in the same two scenarios, and the performance is degraded much in the other scenarios. Besides, different Linux kernels show similar behaviors (only report Linux-3.17.4 for better performance), indicating the performance isolation is poor in an SFTI OS architecture as it shares many data structures protected by locks. 7.2.2. Improving worst-case performance In this section, we test and verify RainForest's ability of reducing tail latency and improving resource utilization. The latency-critical workload we choose is Search from BigDataBench [98] . The frontend Tomcat server distributes each request from the clients to all back-end Search, merges the records received from the back ends, and finally responds to the clients. In this benchmark, Tomcat is not the bottleneck according to our massive tests. In our experiments, we choose the real workload trace and set the distribution to be uniform-sending requests at a uniform rate.
When running a single Search, we found the tail latency dramatically climbs up to seconds when the request rate reaches 400 req/s, while the CPU utilization rate cannot surpass 50%. In this experiment, we set up two Search on two OS instances on the same server, each with 6 cores and 16 GB memory. Figure 8 illustrates the tail latencies with increasing load levels. For three Linux kernels, we only show Linux-2.6.35M as it exhibits better worst-case performance. When the load level increases to 400 requests/s, the tail latencies on LXC and Xen deteriorate significantly. The tail latencies are beyond 200 ms except for RainForest. Linux still keeps tail latency below 200 ms owing to free scheduling across all 12 cores, but the tail latency gets much worse after 450 requests/s, indicating aggressive resource sharing will produce more interference. If we demand the endurable limit of the tail latency is 200ms, the maximum throughput of Linux 2.6.35M, LXC, Xen, and RainForest is around 400, 350, 350, 500 request/s, respectively. On these load levels, the CPU utilizations are 59.8%, 58.0%, 55.7%, and 69.7%, respectively. Although the CPU utilization of Linux can finally reach to ∼90% at 600 req/s, the tail latency becomes totally unacceptable. 7.2.3. Services mixed with offline workloads Co-running online services and offline batches is always a thorny problem. We investigate RainForest's performance isolation in terms of co-running Search with batch workloads. In this test, each OS instance runs on 6 cores and 16 GB memory within a NUMA node. We run Search and a PARSEC workload on each OS instance, respectively. The baseline is solo running Search on one OS instance of each system. The requests are replayed in a uniform distribution at 300 requests/s, beyond which the tail latency on Xen will deteriorate dramatically. Figure 9 illustrates the performance degradation of tail latency with respect to the baseline. In accordance with Figure 8 , Xen has the poorest tail latency performance (210.9 ms) when running Nutch at 300 req/s. Actually, even at 250 req/s, its tail latency is still high as 150.6 ms, greater than LXC and RainForest, and the average degradation reaches 25.6%. As the virtualization overhead exists, Xen is not suited for a high load level, and it behaves worse than LXC.
RainForest exhibits good performance isolation almost in all the cases, while the other systems get larger tail latencies in many cases. The increase of tail latency in RainForest is always less than 8%, while that of LXC is high as 46%. If we only care about the average performance of of- fline batches [10] , Xen gains better performance than Linux. But unfortunately, in this case, the tail latency of Search deteriorates worse, which is totally unacceptable.
Flexibility of resource sharing
In this section, we evaluate the overhead and agility of adjusting resources when consolidating Search with varying loads and PARSEC workloads.
Evaluating elasticity overhead
We evaluate the overhead of creating, destroying, and resizing the OS instance by performing these operations 100 times on an S-A type server. For two OS instance configurations, Table 4 lists the overheads on LXC, Xen, and RainForest.
From the experimental results, we can find that the elasticity of these systems can be overall described as LXC > RainForest > Xen. For LXC, allocating and deallocating re- sources are not really conducted on physical resources but performed by updating the filter parameters of the cgroup subsystem. Although an adjustment operation is always quickly responded, it may take a long time to take effect. For Xen, the adjusting phase is also longer. Besides getting emulated resources ready before loading a domU kernel, VMM needs to prepare several software facilities, including setting up shadow page tables, shared pages, communication channels, etc.
Agile changes to dynamic workloads
Here we evaluate the agility of the three systems to fastchanging workloads. We initially configure the server with two OS instances as in Section 7.2.3. But the request rate is fluctuated according to the original distribution. We package 13 PARSEC benchmarks into a batch job and run it repeatedly in one OS instance while a Nutch back-end search server runs in the other OS instance. Meanwhile, a preliminary scheduler is adopted to adjust the resources of the two OS instances to reduce the tail latency of Search. In this test, we only adjust the CPUs of two OS instances rather than finding the optimal strategy of adjusting all resources, which is actually an open issue and not our focus. We set two thresholds (lt, ut) to bound the tail latency. That is if the tail latency of the last 10 seconds is above the upper threshold-ut, a CPU will be transferred from the PARSEC OS instance to the other, and vice versa. We record the CPU adjustment events and tail latency variations throughout the replay of 482400 requests in 37.5 minutes. From Figure 10 , we observe that both Linux and LXC have large fluctuations, showing unstable worst-case performance. Xen has smaller fluctuations but the tail latency even exceeds 500 ms. Relatively, RainForest exhibits the most stable worst-case performance, mostly between 200 ms and 300 ms. Meanwhile, after replaying all the requests, the num- ber of PARSEC benchmarks finished on Linux-2.6.32, Linux-2.6.35M, Linux-3.17.4, LXC, Xen, and RainForest is 22, 26, 25, 19, 6 , and 20, respectively. Xen finished less PARSEC benchmarks because the tail latency cannot be reduced to below 200 ms even 11 cores are occupied. RainForest outperforms the other systems in terms of both the worst-case performance and the average performance of the batch jobs in terms of running time. Figure 11 replays the CPU adjustment events for all systems. In Linux, the Nutch search server and the PARSEC workloads compete for resources adversely, and we do not report the actual CPU number occupied by the Nutch search server. Table 5 reports the running time of the PARSEC batch jobs and the corresponding performance of Search on each system. The search throughput on each system does not differ significantly, while the 99% tail latencies are quite different. In RainForest, the tail latency is lowest (230.2 ms) and the batch job runs faster (1520.0 seconds) than LXC and Xen. Interestingly, we also observe Linux 3.17.4 gains the best average performance in terms of both the running time of the PAR-SEC benchmarks and the Nutch throughput, however, its tail latency is the worst (high as 410.8). It again confirms that the SFTI OS architecture is optimized toward the average performance.
Scalability
We initiate four OS instances for LXC, Xen, and RainForest on a S-B type server. Each OS instance has 10 cores and 250GB RAM, among which 50GB is used for the tmpfs file system.
Latency-critical workloads
We use an in-memory key-value store (memcached) to evalu- ate the tail latency with increasing cores. The memcached benchmark we use is a variant of that in MOSBench [20] . Similar to the method in Section 3, we run multiple memcached servers in Linux, each on its own port and being bound to a dedicated core. For the other systems, the requests are sent averagely into four OS instances. We profile the lookup time of all requests and present the tail latencies with increasing cores in Figure 12 . Although the scalability problem still exists, the tail latency on RainForest increases slowly than the others. When the core number is 40, the tail latency improvements of RainForest in comparison with Linux 2.6.32, Linux 2.6.35M, Linux 3.17.4, LXC, and Xen are 7.8x, 4.2x, 2.0x, 1.3x, and 1.4x, respectively. Among the three Linux kernels, Linux 2.6.35M gets the highest throughput. RainForest gains the highest throughput among the six systems.
Using Spark application workloads
On Linux, we use the "standalone" deploy mode with the 4 worker instances on LXC, Xen, and RainForest (each OS instance runs a worker instance). The Spark [100] workloads include OLAP SQL queries (Select, Aggregation, and Join) from [98, 78] and offline analytic algorithms (Kmeans and PageRank) 2 . Figure 13 shows their performance on the systems, including RainForest with RFloop enabled. Although the bandwidth limit of the memory controllers and peripherals may still be bottlenecks, we also get much improvement from RainForest. The maximum speedups are 1.43x, 1.16x, and 1.78x compared to Linux, LXC, and Xen, respectively. With RFloop enabled, the maximum speedup is 1.71x, 1.69x, and 2.60x, respectively. For Join and Aggregation, the time consumed in data shuffling among Spark workers takes a high proportion out of the whole execution. RFloop facilitates them with fast communication channels. Using netperf, the TCP stream performance of RFloop is 0.63x of the local loop, 1.47x of a virtual NIC of Xen, and 15.95x of a physical NIC.
For the UDP stream test, the speedup is 0.44x, 13.02x, and 4.34x, respectively. As many workloads still benefit from shared memory, the number of OS instances where the application is distributed influences the performance. We tested Select, Aggregation, and Join on 2, 4, 6, and 8 subOSes using the same server. We find that the optimal subOS number is four for Select and Aggregation, while for Join eight subOSes gets the best performance (the improvement can achieve 170%).
Experience and Limitations
RainForest is a concrete implementation of our model. However, it is only a point in the implementation space.
First, implementing a subOS as a Linux-like OS instance is not required by the model. However, it is commercially significant [7] for DC workloads. We also conducted comparison with IX [17] with respect to the worst performance of a single memcached instance with a specific NIC. Without any optimization, the performance of a subOS is worse than IX as expected. It is realistic to absorb the idea of directing accessing virtualized I/O devices in a subOS architecture for latency-critical workloads.
Second, we have compared RainForest with Barrelfish using the munmap microbenchmark (we failed to run application benchmarks). Barrelfish shows good scalability consistent with [14] . But with increasing memory size to be unmapped, the average and tail latencies deteriorate significantly. The reason might reside in the two-phase commit protocol, used to ensure global consistence. In this case, the message passing system needs to queue large amount of messages caused by splitted unmap operations, indicating the potential bottleneck for the message passing approach.
Third, as our model encourages running subOSes side by side, it can be easily extended to multiple coherence domains that have no hardware cache coherence. However, its flexibility of resource sharing will be limited and we can only elastically partition resources within a domain, or else we have to leverage the DSM technology among several domains in [65] .
Finally, the number of subOSes is strictly limited by the cores or SMT threads, but we can integrate containers or guest OSes in a subOS. Two-level scheduling is an interesting open issue. When the peripheral devices are not enough or sharing them may not degrade much the performance of applications on other subOSes, we can leverage the virtualization technology like the split-driver model [24, 66] , which is applied to block and network devices.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an IFTS OS model and a new OS abstraction-subOS, which is not only a management facility for flexible resource management but also an independent execution environment qualified for a resource principal. We explore the space of applying the IFTS OS model to a concrete OS implementation: RainForest, which is fully compatible with Linux ABI. Our comprehensive evaluations demonstrate RainForest outperforms Linux with three kernels, LXC, and Xen in terms of improving resource utilization, throughput, scalability and reducing tail latency.
